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LANDLORD AND TENANT-LANDLORD HAS DUTY TO EMPLOY
REASONABLE SECURITY MEASURES TO AVOID FORESEEABLE CRIMINAL
ATTACKS ON TENANTS. Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd., 617 F.
Supp. 646 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
An intruder raped a tenant in an apartment complex owned by the
defendants. The rape occurred after the assailant unlawfully entered
the tenant's apartment. The tenant filed a complaint in federal court
based upon diversity jurisdiction alleging that the apartment owners
negligently failed to provide security against unauthorized entries, se-
curity devices such as dead bolt or tamperproof locks, and adequate
curtains or other privacy devices. The complaint also alleged that the
defendants did not inspect and correct security devices, warn tenants to
obtain security devices, or exercise ordinary care to insure safety from
criminal attacks.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the court denied,
holding that if the Arkansas Supreme Court were presented with the
issue, it would recognize a duty owed by a landlord to employ reasona-
ble security measures to avoid foreseeable criminal attacks on tenants
by third persons. Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 646
(W.D. Ark. 1985).
The history of landlord-tenant relationships has evolved slowly to
reflect changes in social and economic conditions.' At early common
law, leases had both property and contract characteristics.' In the thir-
teenth century, leases were used as security devices for loans and thus
resembled a conveyance of property rights in form only.3 The term for
years was classified as a nonfreehold estate and as personal property."
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, farming leases changed the
purpose of the lease to subsistence and shelter. By the end of the fif-
teenth century tenants could bring an action of ejectment to recover the
possession of the leased land. The term for years came to be defined as
an estate in real property, but less than a freehold interest.' The main
purpose of a lease was to give a possessory interest in land, rather than
1. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 269-75 (1923).
2. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 221[1] at 178-79 (P. Rohan ed. 1985).
3. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 36, II1, 113-16 (2d ed.
1923).
4. Id. The term for years was referred to as a chattel real, in reference to its special connec-
tion with land. Id. at 116.
5. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *140.
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to provide a right to use a structure as a dwelling.6
As the economy changed from agricultural to industrial and the
population shifted into the cities in the nineteenth century, the concept
of the periodic tenancy emerged to govern residential rentals, especially
multi-unit apartments. 7 The structures, therefore, became at least as
important as the land itself.8 Written leases came into common use and
began to appear less like conveyances and more like contracts based on
mutual promises.9 At the same time, periodic tenancies set by oral
agreement became common in urban residential rentals, especially
among lower-income groups. However, because of transience and pov-
erty, few landlord and tenant cases in this category are reported.10 Re-
lationships between landlords and tenants were governed by the cove-
nants contained in written leases, where leases existed, with the
common law filling in omissions and ruling on unwritten agreements."
Traditional rules of landlord-tenant law prevailed in the United
States until the decades of the 1960's and 1970's, when the law under-
went major changes. 2 The landlord's main obligation was to deliver
possession, while the tenant's primary obligation was to pay rent. 3 The
implied coveant of quiet enjoyment developed out of the landlord's duty
to deliver possession, extending the concept of possession to include a
promise that neither the landlord, his agents nor anyone with title supe-
rior to the landlord would disturb the tenant's possession.' 4 However,
the landlord had no obligation regarding the condition of the premises
at delivery or repairs during the term of the lease.' 6 Any risk of loss
due to destruction or deterioration fell on the tenant, 6 and the obliga-
tion to pay rent continued despite the loss.' 7 This rule of independent
covenants 8 meant that if the tenant defaulted in his payments the
6. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 22111] at 178.
7. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 79-83 (1962).
8. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 1 221[1] at 180-81.
9. Id.
10. Id. 253 at 374.
11. Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 503,
508 (1982).
12. Id. at 503.
13. I H. TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 182 (1912).
14. Id. § 79 at 552-53.
15. Id. § 86(a) at 556, § 87(a) at 574.
16. Id. § 87(g) at 617.
17. C. MOYNIHlAN, supra note 7, at 70.
18. An independent covenant is "where either party may recover damages from the other for
the injuries he may have received by a breach of the covenants in his favor; and it is no excuse for
the defendant to allege a breach of the covenants on the part of the plaintiff." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 436 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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landlord could not retake possession but could only seize the tenant's
chattels. 19 In a minority of jurisdictions, including Arkansas, the land-
lord had a duty to mitigate the tenant's damages by reletting the prem-
ises if possible.2"
Exceptions to these common law rules began to arise in the nine-
teenth century.2 Lease terms gave the landlord the right to end posses-
sion when the tenant defaulted in rent payments. 2 Summary process
statutes allowed the landlord to enforce his rights against defaulting or
holdover tenants. 3 If the landlord wrongfully ousted the tenant during
the term of the lease, he was liable for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, and his right to rents was suspended or ended.2 4 The legal
fiction of constructive eviction, which made the landlord's failure to re-
pair equivalent to actual eviction, allowed the tenant to move out and
treat the lease as terminated with no further obligation to pay rent.25
Still, the tenant had little recourse for unfit or dangerous condi-
tions in the rented dwelling.26 The landlord generally had no duty to
deliver the premises in fit condition.2 7 When unfit conditions arose dur-
ing the lease term, the burden of repair fell on the tenant.28 Because
the landlord had no responsibility to make repairs, he was not liable for
injuries caused by defective conditions.2'
Several exceptions developed to ameliorate the harshness of this
rule. If the landlord knew of hidden defects but did not disclose them
to the tenant, he could be held liable for resulting injuries., If the
landlord negligently failed to keep common areas in good repair,3" or
19. C. MOYNIHAN. supra note 7, at 70-71.
20. See, e.g., La Vasque v. Beeson, 164 Ark. 95, 261 S.W. 49 (1924). A later Arkansas case,
Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934), refused to impose a duty to mitigate on
the landlord because of the tenant's wrongdoing. In Baston v. Davis, 229 Ark. 666, 318 S.W.2d
837 (1958), the court held that a tenant has a duty to mitigate when his assignee abandons. See
generally Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d 534, 541 (1968).
21. Glendon, supra note II, at 512.
22. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 274(d) & (e) at 1764-65.
23. Id. § 274(d) at 1764.
24. Id. § 184 at 1258, § 185(a) at 1258-59.
25. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 72-73.
26. See generally I H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 87.
27. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (1952); R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 203 (3d ed. 1981). Exceptions existed when the landlord fraudulently misrepresented
the condition of the premises and for short-term leases of furnished premises. I H. TIFFANY, supra
note 13, § 86 at 561-62, 570-74.
28. See generally Glendon, supra note 11, at 515-16.
29. I H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 87 at 575, 649; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 435
(1968).
30. I H. TIFFANY. supra note 13, § 86 at 562-70.
31. Id. § 87 at 628-40 and § 91 at 641-44.
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made repairs negligently,32 he also risked liability. A landlord could
also be held liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of
which he was aware on premises leased for use by the public."a
A series of landmark cases set precedents for sweeping changes in
landlord-tenant law in many jurisdictions beginning in 1970. In that
year, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.4 that an implied war-
ranty of habitability applied to landlords, and that the landlord's and
tenant's lease covenants are mutually dependent. As a result, tenants
could receive rent abatements without vacating the premises when the
landlord failed to remedy defects.3 5 The court used standards set out in
the District of Columbia housing regulations as the foundation for the
warranty. 6 The court alternately justified its position by contrasting
modern urban- conditions with the feudal agrarian economy in which
the traditional rules arose. 7 The court reasoned that a lease is like
other contracts and represents a "package of goods and services" rather
than a conveyance of a mere possessory interest in land.38
The court in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp.,3 9 another 1970 decision from the District of Columbia Circuit,
used a negligence theory to hold a landlord liable for a criminal attack
on a tenant by a third party. The court in Kline discussed the reasons
courts had previously declined to change the rule that the landlord has
no duty to protect tenants from crime."" Among these were the idea
that the crime was a superceding cause, the difficulty in determining
foreseeability of criminal acts, subjection of the landlord to a vague
standard, adverse economic consequences, conflict with the allocation
of crime prevention to the government, and judicial reluctance to upset
the established common law landlord-tenant relationship."' The court
32. Id. § 87 at 608.
33. Id. § 89 at 655.
34. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Note, Property-Implied Warranty of Habitability
in Leases, 26 ARK. L. REV. 94, 97-98 (1972) for a discussion of the Arkansas position at that time
regarding the application of warranties to leases.
35. 428 F.2d at 1082-83.
36. Id. at 1072-73.
37. Id. at 1077-79.
38. Id. at 1074.
39. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). An intruder assaulted a tenant in an apartment hallway
after a series of prior criminal incidents and a reduction in building security measures. Id. at 478-
80.




based its ruling on the landlord's control over common areas,4 the
analogy of the landlord-tenant relationship to innkeepers and guests, "'
and the contractual nature of the modern lease, which the court said
includes an implied protective service. 4
In 1973, in Sargent v. Ross,"5 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
abandoned the general rule of landlord tort immunity, and in its place
adopted the same reasonable care standard of general tort law that ap-
plies to other personal injury cases. The court said that the traditional
exceptions are only relevant as evidence of reasonableness .4 Thus, the
landlord was liable in tort for the death of a tenant's child who fell
from a steep outside stairway that the landlord built without adequate
railings .4 The landlord's control over the area and the question of hid-
den danger became relevant only as evidence of foreseeability and rea-
sonable care. 8
In another major case, Trentacost v. Brussel,19 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a landlord must provide reasonable security
measures to prevent third party criminal attacks on tenants in common
areas of apartments when he is aware of a potentially dangerous situa-
tion. The landlord had failed to provide a lock for the front door of his
apartment building which was located in a high crime area. As a re-
sult, a mugger assaulted and robbed a tenant on a common stairway
inside the lobby.50 The court extended the implied warranty of habita-
bility to impose a duty on the landlord to provide reasonable safeguards
to protect tenants from foreseeable crime on the leased premises.5 1 The
court based the duty solely on the landlord-tenant relationship, 52 noting
the high incidence of crime in urban society and the normal expecta-
tions of modern urban tenants for a safe living environment. 3
The theories set out in these cases formed the bases for numerous
decisions in other jurisdictions.5 4 Courts have justified the tort rationale
42. Id. at 480-81, 484.
43. Id. at 482-83.
44. Id. at 481-82.
45. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
46. Id. at 398-99, 308 A.2d at 534-35.
47. Id.
48. Id.





54. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:15 (1980); Brow-
der, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 109-19, 144-
1985-861
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first applied in Sargent and Trentacost by the landlord's ability to
maintain common areas55 and control access to apartments through
common areas.5 6 Some courts have characterized the landlord-tenant
relationship as a special one imposing a duty on the landlord to provide
security.57 The urban settings of modern apartments, in which tenants
have no realistic means to improve security, have been an important
factor for some courts.58 Foreseeability of criminal activity because of
locations in high crime areas or a past history of crime on the premises
has been the primary focus for many others.59
Legislative reforms in landlord and tenant law beginning in the
late 1960's also reflect the trend toward expanding landlords' duties.60
Thirty-six states passed legislation between 1969 and 1982 creating
new duties for landlords similar to the warranty of habitability created
by the courts.6 These statutes have provided the basis for liability in a
number of court decisions.62 Violations of the statutory provisions are
viewed by the courts as negligence per se or as evidence of negligence.6 3
In contrast to the legislative and judicial activity in the majority of
states, Arkansas landlord-tenant statues still reflect the traditional
common law rules. 4 The last action by the legislature in the area of
residential landlord-tenant law was a provision regulating security de-
posits.66 A modified version of the Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act was
50; Glendon, supra note 11, at 524-26, 535-36.
55. See, e.g., Graham v. M&J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980) (landlord's failure
to provide front door lock and rear exit in duplex in high crime area raised jury question of
foreseeability).
56. Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
57. Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
58. Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978).
59. See O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798,
142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) and cases cited supra notes 55, 56 & 58.
60. Browder, supra note 54, at 112-15; Glendon, supra note 11, at 523-24. Glendon counted
38 states which had given tenants new rights and remedies by statute.
61. Browder, supra note 54, at 112-13 n. 55; see also Glendon, supra note II, at 523-24 nn.
135-36.
62. See, e.g., Gula v. Garvel, 71 111. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966); Williams v. Fontes,
383 Mass. 95, 417 N.E.2d 963 (1981). Compare the formulations for liability based on statutory
violations contained in the Restatement (Second) of Property § 17.6(2) (1977) (reasonable care
standard) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 288A and 288B(1) (1965) ("per se" negli-
gence rule with certain exceptions).
63. See generally Browder, supra note 54, at 105-08, 123-33.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70. The majority of the Arkansas landlord-tenant
statutes date from the 1838 codification of the common law. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-501 to -
524 (1971). The last prior revision is represented by 1937 Ark. Acts 129 (codified at ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 50-523 (1971)). Act 129 broadened the misdemeanor provisions for holdover tenants to
include land as well as buildings.
65. 1979 Ark. Acts 531 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-525 to -530 (1971)). The Act set
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proposed, but failed, in 1979.6"
Arkansas cases show adherence to the traditional common law
principles as well. The Arkansas Supreme Court held in 1926 that the
tenant has the duty to inspect the rented premises and provide his own
repairs, rejecting an implied warranty of suitability unless the landlord
has been guilty of fraud or concealment of defects.6 7 Later cases reiter-
ated the same position.68 As late as 1970, the court held that a landlord
could not be forced to make repairs unless he had expressly agreed to
do so. 69 Independence of covenants is still the law in Arkansas; the
state supreme court held in 1967 that the obligation to pay rent is not
affected by destruction of a leased building by fire.70
Consistent with its prior decisions, the court continues to regard
the landlord's tort liability as governed by the well-known traditional
rules and exceptions. For example, if the landlord undertakes repairs
and does them negligently, he can be held liable.7' In a decision taking
an even more restricted view of landlord liability, the court has held
that the landlord is not required to light common passageways.7 2 Thirty
years later, the court adhered to its statement of the no-liability rule in
holding that a landlord has no duty to remove temporary hazards from
a common stairway. 73
Some Arkansas cases show a very slow trend toward using ordi-
maximum deposit limits and standards for returning deposits.
66. S.B. 607, sponsored by Sen. Mike Wilson in the 72nd General Assembly, Regular Ses-
sion of 1979, was passed by the Senate, but H.B. 1106, sponsored by Rep. Gloria Cabe, died in
the House Committee on Public Health. H.B. 1106, 72nd General Assembly, Regular Session
(1979). Telephone interview with Larry Holifield, Arkansas Legislative Council (March 10,
1986). The proposed Act contained 48 sections and would have been a comprehensive revision of
the existing law.
67. Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926).
68. Tipps v. Mullis, 257 Ark. 622, 519 S.W.2d 67 (1975) (tenant's contention that premises
were unfit was no defense to action for rent under lease obligating landlord to make repairs after
notice; tenant had failed to give notice); see also Davis v. Seay, 247 Ark. 396, 445 S.W.2d 885
(1969) (absent agreement, a tenant is presumed to repair and improve rented premises for his own
benefit); Ferrill v. Collins, 225 Ark. 247, 281 S.W.2d 939 (1955) (lease providing that a tenant is
responsible for repairs in areas under his control is enforceable).
69. Sparkman v. Etter, 249 Ark. 93, 458 S.W.2d 129 (1970).
70. Lawson v. Taylor Hotels, 242 Ark. 6, 411 S.W. 2d 669 (1967).
71. Sparks v. Murray, 120 Ark. 17, 178 S.W. 909 (1915) (faulty roof repair resulting in
damage to tenant's goods).
72. Joseph v. Riffel, 186 Ark. 418, 53 S.W. 2d 987 (1932). Compare the traditional rule that
the landlord is usually responsible for areas under his exclusive control; see supra text accompany-
ing notes 30-33.
73. Kilbury v. McConnell, 246 Ark. 528, 438 S.W.2d 692 (1969) (day-old accumulation of
ice and snow).
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nary tort principles to hold landlords liable.7 ' The supreme court an-
nounced that it would apply a negligence standard to determine
whether a tenant's guest could recover for injuries caused by repairs to
a porch.7" The court said that either the repair itself must be negli-
gently made or the landlord should have known that the boards needed
repair.7 6 In Hudson Chevrolet Co. v. Sparrow,77 the court held a land-
lord liable on the theory of res ipsa loquitur for injuries suffered by a
tenant when sewer gas exploded in a shower without a trap.78
By contrast, in sales of houses (as opposed to leases), the court has
gradually expanded the scope of the implied warranty of habitability.
In Wawak v. Stewart," the court applied the theory to sales of new
housing,"' and at the same time abolished the rule of caveat emptor as
a matter of public policy. 81 Eleven years later, the court extended the
warranty to second buyers for latent defects in construction.82 A year
later, the court stated in dictum in a landlord and tenant case involving
an apartment fire, that the jury had ample evidence to find a breach of
the warranty of habitability, 83 thereby indicating that the same rules
might apply to landlords.
In Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd.,84 the District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas held that the Arkansas Supreme Court
would recognize a duty owed by a landlord to his tenants to employ
reasonable security measures to avoid foreseeable criminal attacks by
74. See cases cited infra notes 75-78 & 83.
75. Alston v. Kahn, 242 Ark. 47, 411 S.W.2d 659 (1967).
76. Id. at 49, 411 S.W.2d at 661.
77. 250 Ark. 849, 467 S.W.2d 751 (1971).
78. Id.
79. 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970). For a discussion of the case see Young and
Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REV. 245 (1970). See also
Wingfield v. Page, 278 Ark. 276, 644 S.W.2d 940 (1983) (implied warranty of habitability arises
by implication of law, not agreement in fact, and is intended to hold builder-vendor to a "path of
fairness." Id. at 279, 644 S.W.2d at 942); Bull v. Brantner, 10 Ark. App. 229, 662 S.W.2d 476
(1984); Pickler v. Fisher, 7 Ark. App. 125, 644 S.W.2d 644 (1983) (a reading of Wawak makes it
apparent that the judicially declared implied warranties created by it were motivated by a desire
to equalize the "indefensible contrast" between the rules applied to the sale of real property and
the rules applied to sales of personal property. Id. at 128, 644 S.W.2d 645-46). Cf Bankston v.
McKenzie, 287 Ark. 350, 698 S.W.2d 799 (1985).
80. 247 Ark. at 1100, 449 S.W.2d at 926.
81. Id. at 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 925.
82. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W,2d 321 (1981).
83. Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185, 190, 633 S.W.2d 362, 364-65 (1982) (the issue was
whether the introduction of evidence of a former owner's financial status may have improperly
influenced the jury's award of damages).
84. 617 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
[Vol. 8:735
LANDLORD AND TENANT
third persons. The court applied Arkansas law under Erie" princi-
ples, 86 in the absence of an Arkansas decision on the issue.87 Judge H.
Franklin Waters first stated that, under the law of Arkansas, the issue
of duty is a question of law and never a question of fact for the jury. 8
In order to determine what position the Arkansas courts would take
regarding the landlord's duty to prevent criminal attacks on tenants,
the court found it necessary to examine cases addressing analogous
issues. 89
The district court found support for such a duty in a series of three
Arkansas cases decided between 1932 and 1983.90 Judge Waters noted
that in Joseph v. Riffel,91 the Arkansas Supreme Court had held that
the landlord has no legal obligation to light common passageways for
the benefit of tenants in the absence of statute or agreement. But in a
1969 case, Kilbury v. McConnell,92 the court followed Joseph only re-
luctantly, since it recognized that other jurisdictions favored a rule im-
posing a duty of reasonable care on landlords to keep their premises
free from such hazards.9 3
Judge Waters then turned to Keck v. American Employment
Agency, Inc.94 for an indication of the current Arkansas position on
liability for third-party crimes.9 5 In Keck, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed a directed verdict for the employment agency, 98 holding that it
had a duty to exercise ordinary care in its relationship with Mrs.
Keck, 7 a jobseeker who was raped by a man posing as an employer. ' 8
The court held that the agency created the contractual relationship by
offering its services, and the relationship carried with it the duty to
exercise ordinary care.99 Judge Waters stated that the court's progres-
sion away from the more conservative cases is shown by the analogies
85. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86. 617 F. Supp. at 647.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 64-86, and see infra text accompanying note 112.
88. 617 F. Supp. at 647 (citing Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Harelson, 238 Ark. 452, 382 S.W.2d
900 (1964); Keller v. White, 173 Ark. 885, 293 S.W. 1017 (1927)).
89. 617 F. Supp. at 647.
90. Id.
91. 186 Ark. 418, 53 S.W.2d 987 (1932).
92. 246 Ark. 528, 438 S.W.2d 692 (1969).
93. Id. at 532-33, 438 S.W.2d at 694.
94. 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d 2 (1983).
95. 617 F. Supp. at 648.
96. 279 Ark. at 296, 652 S.W.2d at 3-4.
97. Id. at 298, 652 S.W.2d at 6.
98. Id. at 296, 652 S.W.2d at 4.
99. Id. at 300, 652 S.W.2d at 6.
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drawn in Keck' 00 to cases from other jurisdictions involving rapes of
tenants"'1 and an assault of a woman in a supermarket parking lot.
1 0 2
Judge Waters quoted the rule from Keck:
Specifically, where a victim of a rape can show that a defendant
who owed some duty to the victim, breached that duty, and could
foresee that the breach might result in injury to the victim, and that
breach was a significant factor in a rape, then a jury question of negli-
gence exists. In other words, such cases should not be automatically
dismissed.103
A final factor in the district court's analysis was the liberal procedural
rules favoring the plaintiff in a motion to dismiss.104
While other states debate the limits and theories of the landlord's
liability to tenants for third-party crimes, Arkansas landlord-tenant law
remains comparatively inactive.'06 However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court implicitly recognized an implied warranty of habitability in the
landlord-tenant context in Dalrymple v. Fields,0 6 and the court also
cited with approval in Keck decisions from other jurisdictions finding
landlords liable for foreseeable criminal attacks.0 7 A holding that a
landlord has a duty to prevent criminal attacks on tenants would be
consistent with the judicial attitude implied in these cases.
Perhaps the lack of up-to-date landlord and tenant statutes'0 " is
one reason Arkansas lags behind the trend in the United States toward
expanding landlord liability. 0 9 Commentators have noted the impor-
tant catalytic role that statues have played in judicial decisions in other
states." 0 Arkansas is one of only seven states without either revised
100. 617 F. Supp. at 648.
101. Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978); O'Hara v. Western
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977);
Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
102. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 279, 426 A.2d 521 (1981), affid, 89 N.J.
270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).
103. 617 F. Supp. at 648 (quoting 279 Ark. at 301, 652 S.W.2d at 6).
104. 617 F. Supp. at 649. A rule 12(b)(6) motion should be denied unless "it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintif" can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle
him to relief." Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
105. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
106. 276 Ark. 185, 633 S.W.2d 362 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
107. See Keck v. American Employment Agency, Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 301-02, 652 S.W.2d 2,
6-7 (1983) (citing Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978)); O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1977); Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
108. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
I10. See generally Glendon, supra note 11, at 519-20, 523-24; Browder, supra note 54, at
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landlord-tenant statutes or a court ruling enlarging or creating duties
for landlords.111 A statute, of course, is not a prerequisite for a holding
enlarging landlord duties."' Some jurisdictions have not waited for leg-
islation before ruling that landlords are liable for foreseeable criminal
attacks on tenants." 3 Arkansas should join the overwhelming majority
of states" 4 in discarding the old law as an "out-worn relic" unsuited to
the social conditions of our time." 5
Mildred Havard Hansen
123-34.
Ill. Browder, supra note 54, at 113 n. 56. The other six states are Alabama, Colorado,
Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah. Id.
112. See generally R. SCHOSI-IINSKI, supra note 54, § 4:15, at 217-23.
113. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978); Johnston v. Harris,
387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
114. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
115. Browder, supra note 54, at 113.
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